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It has been little more than a decade since the onset of the international debt "crisis", oí
less than full and timely repayment of debt obligations by borrowers in sovereign coun-
tries who had borrowed large sums of money from private banks in Western industrialized
nations. About the same time ago, the pioneering study of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981]
was the first to note and analyze the impact of some of the salient features of sovereign
debt, which set it apart from domestic debt contracts for which repayment incentives
are enforced by a judicial system with credible penalties (see, for example, Gale and
Hellwig (1985J). Eaton and Gersovitz noted that such credible judicial mechanisms are
hardly available at an international level, particularly when the borrowers are sovereign
governments or their agents. They then studied the impact of threatened termination
ofJurther lending in the event of non-repayment of earlier loans, as a device for creating
incentives for repayment by sovereign borrowers. In their model, the penalty arising
írom termination of lending is that of non-availability of finance to smooth intertem-
poral variations in consumption arising from endowment or productivity shocks in the
sovereign debtor economies.l Eaton and Gersovitz [1981] showed that, given such "ter-
mination threats", some degree of borrowing and lending, which led to a second-best
level of consumption-smoothing over time by borrowers, was indeed feasible.
In the past few years, there has been an explosion of literature on the sovereign debt
problem, augmenting and sometimes modifying the analysis of Eaton and Gersovitz, and
examining the role (if any) that creditor country governments and multilateral financial
institutions (such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund) may play
in alleviating the sovereign debt "crisis" of zero or partial repayments by borro~~-ers.~
Some authors, such as Corden [1989], Helpman (1989], and Froot and Krugman (1990],
have essentially ignored the non-enforceable contractual aspect oí sovereign debt, and
tThe credibility of the termination threat is ensured by (a) zero profits among competing lenders,
and (b) the seniority of earlier debt contracts in the eyea of courta in the creditor countries.
~The problem of non-repayment is widety agreed to have been caused by (i) rising real interest rates
in the 1980s, (ii) declining terms of trade for many sovereign borrowers, and (iii) "capital flight" of
investing abroad by private citizens in debtor countries.2
focused in large part on the diminished incentives for internal investment (in industries
producing exportable goods) for sovereign debtors caused by a large debt "overhang", of
debt repayment commitments relative to uncertain future export earnings of sovereign
debtors. Given the inefficiency arising from such diminished investment incentives, and
the resulting reduced growth rate in debtor countries, some of these authors have argued
that there could be a"Debt Laffer Curve", such that reducing the contractual repay-
ment obligation could result in higher values of their debt contracts for lenders, via the
improved incentives for investment and growth for sovereign debtors. D4}-ers (197ï] ~~~as
the first to analyae these incentive effects in a domestic debt context.
1`loreover, authors such as Corden, Helpman, and Froot-Krugman have argued, there
exists a serious coordination proólem across multiple creditors involved in negotiations
over reductions of contractual debt repayment obligations. (Such reductions may be
either in the joint interests of creditors as a whole, given a"Debt Laffer Curve", or
be obtainable through aid provided by third parties.) The reason is that, since default
probabilities are lower on inframarginal as compared to marginal repayment obligations,
each creditor has an incentive to "free-ride" on reductions in contractual repayment
obligations by other creditors, which improve the value of the "hold-out" creditor's share
of the remaining repayment obligations in which creditors share pari passu . Indeed,
even buying back debt at discounted market prices that reflect its default risks, is not
an answer to this coordination problem unless it can be done with the debtor's o~~~n
resources. The reason is that buying back debt rewards creditors at the rate of the slope
of the chord from the origin, on the concave curve linking debt value to contractual
obligation given default prospects, whereas fair compensation ought to be based on the
slope of the tangent to this debt value curve at the relevant point, which is lower than
the slope of the chord 3. ln this context, these authors, particularly Corden [1959], have
proposed a coordinating role jor multilatenal ~inancial instifutions . Corden suggests the
creation of senior debt, with priority over repayment obligations to pri~~ate banks, by
3Froot and Iírugman (1990~ estimate that for Ecuador a fifty per cent reduction in the face value of
its debt obligation, by roughly S5 billion, would reduce the market value of Ecuador's external debt by
only S550 million. ln contrast, the cost ofsuch a debt buybac~ at the discounted (average) market price
would cost 82.9 billion.3
debtor country governments as obligations to a World Bank cum I.A1.F. "Debt Facility",
in return for money to retire some of the debt obligations to private bank creditors. If
done right, the resulting dilution in the value of the private banks' inframarginal debt
contracts can make up for any excess value paid in buying back their marginal debt at
the discounted average market prices.
In a stream of recent papers, Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1989, 1990] have taken a quite
different position, particularly on the merits of governmental or multi-lateral intervention
in the debt renegotiation process, as compared to the authors mentioned above. In Bu-
low and Rogoff (1989], they analyze a model in which, as in Eaton and Gersovitz [19S1],
contractua] obligations per se have no impact on the degree to which sovereign debtors
are willing to repay their debt. Instead, repayment incentives are eníorced through the
threat of harmful penalties in the event of (suflicient) default. In contrast to Eaton and
Gersovitz, Bulow-Rogoff emphasize the penalties arising from trade sanction threats as
the important device for enforcing (partially) the tepayment obligations. The bargain-
ing process over the magnitude of repayments, by sovereign debtors to Bank creditors
(syndicates), is modeled in Bulow-Rogoff [1989] as a complete-information repeated al-
ternating offers game, as in Rubinstein (1982]. As a result oí this assumption, the
"constant-recontracting" possibilities of their model (and title) are reduced to instanta-
neous agreement on the first offer as the unique subgame-períect bargaining outcome.
In Bulow-Rogoff (1988, 1990], the authors expand on their view of the sovereign debt
problem, to analyze the potential role of creditor country governments and multilateral
financial institutions ~. In Bulow-Rogoff [1985], the authors analyze an extended trilaleral
óargainingmodel of the Rubinstein [1982] type, in which the size of the "pie" subject to
division via a rotating offer sequence requiring acceptance by the others, is that of (i) the
export value of the sovereign debtor plus (ii) the consumer surplus derived by citizens
of the creditor country from uninterrupted Lrade with the debtor country. Focusing on
~R,otemberg [1988] has questioned the validity of a perfect-information bargaining framework, in
light of the seemingly long delays in arriving at negotiated debt reduction plans for sovereign debtors.
He develops a model of beneficial debt buybacks, in which creditors have private information regarding
the costs of sanctions and "harassment" which they can impose on debtors. However, he finds no role
for any governmental policy intervention.4
a by-now-standard stationary "focal" equilibrium, which is reached without any dela}~,
Bulow-Rogoff (1938] show that there exist parameter values such that the pa}.off of
the creditor-country government (and its non-Bank citizens) in the trilateral bargaining
outcome, is lower than its payoff in the bilateral bargaining between private banks and
sovereign debtors. Interpreting this conclusion as one rationalizing unwarranted subsidies
by creditor-country governments to sovereign debtors, which banks anticipate in their
anticipated payoffs and thus volume of initial lending, Bulow and Rogoff [1990] argue
against "being taken to the cleanersn by such governmental intervention in bargaining s.
On the relevance of multilatera] institutions in the sovereign debt (re)negotiation process,
Bulow and Rogoff [1990] are more sanguine and non-paradigmatic. They simply question
the precommitment abilities of the World Bank and I.b4.F. in enforcing the seniority of
their claims relative to that of private banks in the "Debt Facilityn proposed by Corden
[1989] and others. They back up this aspersion of pusillanimity by noting that, in the
last half of the 1980s, almost all net lending to troubled sovereign debtors has come from
these multilateral financial institutions, rather than from private banks.
All this brings us to the lacunae that we seek to addressin this paper. Certainl}~, Bulo~v
and Rogoff (1988, 1989, 1990] have been somewhat innovative in incorporating repeated
rather than single-shot take-it-or-leave it ofiers in their modelling of the so~~ereign debt
repayment problem. They have also been correct to emphasize the differing policy impli-
cations of the (enforceable) contractual versus induced-by-threats views of the sovereign
debt repayment process. Indeed, their modelling of (complete-information) bargaining,
over repayments out of flow export earnings by the sovereign debtor at each point, is
probably appropriate although it makes it diffiicult to rationalize the seemingly long
delays in reaching such renegotiated repayment bargains across sovereign debtors and
pri~~ate banks, unless interventionists governmental processes have been slow as ~vell as
sIn the case of equal intertemporal discount ratea among sovereign debtors, creditor Banks, and
creditor-country governments, the Bulow-R.ogoftconclusion implies that one-third oC the "pie" mentioned
above be less than the creditor country consumer aurplue from uninterrupted trade with the yarticular
sovereign debtor country. We leave it to the reader to imagine the degree of non-substitutability ïor
these tradeable goods that is envisioned.5
misguided, as is their view 6. However, they have failed to provide an adequate justifi-
cation for the subgame pertection, or credibility, of the use of threatened trade sanctions
by creditor-country governments, which result in the loss of consumer surplus írom un-
interrupted trade for their citizens. In other words, how does the government of their
trilateral bargaining scenario (Bulow-Rogoff [1988J) not only "sit out" as Bulow-Rogoff
recommend, thus ]eading to their bilateral bargaining model (Bulow and Rogoff [1989J ),
óut also commit to imposing trade sanctions should private banks and sovereign debtors
reject each other's offers on repayment?
The critical question here is the importance of a governmental rofe in the imposition
of trade sanctions by the creditors, in the face of inadequate repayment oí debt obli-
gations by a sovereign debtor to private banks. (We assume that international judicial
mechanisms can rule out the use of such threats to extort payments by countries which
have not borrowed, or beyond the repayment obligations in the original debt "contract".)
Bulow and Rogoff are less than clear on this. On the one hand, they undermine the im-
portance of the credit-termination threats employed in Eaton and Gersovitz [19S1J, by
arguing that debtor countries could potentially buy insurance in a íutures market (for
future endowment shocks), at a lower cost than that of repaying past debt obligations.
On the other hand, they do not teil us how the force of trade sanctions can arise largely
from private bank actions such as denial of trade-facilitating services, when the sovereign
debtor can simply turn to other banks to restore such facilities ~?
~~'e argue in this paper that, first, the empirical observation of ongoing delays in the
debt write-down process vis-á-vis future obligations of sovereign debtors, does not nec-
essarily support the Corden~Helpman~Froot-Krugman view that contractual repayment
obligations, and the resulting disincentives for marginal investment and inter-lender co-
61f renegotiations are costly, and hence made over future debt repayment obligations given uncertain
export earnings prospects for the sovereign debtor, about whicó it has superior information, then lhe
bargaining model of Vincent (1989] would predict equilibrium delays in aettlement.
7To elaborate, if informational advantagee of extant lending banks give "bite" to their threats of
withdrawing trade-related facilities in the event of default by sovereign debtors, such informational
asymmetries should also cause problema with smooth funetioning of markets in futures contracts for
insuring shocks to the debtors' íuture incomes etc. See Thomas (1991] for support for this argument.6
ordination, are of central importance in the sovereign debt renegotiation problem s. (1n
a model such as that of Vincent [1989J, if the debtor or some banks have superior in-
formation compared to others in the lending syndicate regarding the debtor's future
export earnings prospects, then such bargaining delays would arise.) Adopting instead
the Eaton-Gersovitz view as modified by Bulow and Rogoff, we argue that it is crucial
to envision an economic and institutional set-up that makes governmental participa-
tion in the trade-sanction process credible (subgame-perfect). We show that a natu-
ral role for multilateral financial institutions arises in such a perspective, as agents oí
creditor-country governments through whom these governments credibly promise condi-
tional side-payments to sovereign debtor countries, and ultimately to their private bank
creditors, in the event of "adequater partial repayments by the sovereign debtors. The
magnitude of these repayments are, in turn, determined by the penalties for debtors
arising from the trade sanctions threatened in the event oí inadequate repayment, and
these threats are made credible by the contingent side-payment enforced via a"bond"
administered by the multilateral financial institution(s), with finances pre-committed by
the creditor-country government(s).
Our analysis has all the simplicity, and the shortcomings, of the view of strategic use
of contracts with third parties pioneered in Schelling (1960J, and recently analyzed in an
axiomatic bargaining model by Green (1990J. We ascribe observability and irrevocability
to the contingent contract between the creditor-country government and the multilateral
institution, based on incompletely specified grounds of reputation 9. The non-existence of
an adequate non-cooperative modelling of renegotiations in such a context has precluded
further theoretical explorations of this point on our part thus far. The simple model of
debt renegotiation with a subgame-perfect trade sanction process is detailed in Section
`~Such a view must, of necessity, be based on "optimistic" expectations regarding a New ~Vorld Order,
with its concomitant sanctions and penalties, all of which appear somewhat remote despite the events
of the past year centered on the Persian Gulf!
sAs Green ~1990] notes, "To prevent renegotiating one must either invoke a reputational argument
or make communication between the principal and his partner impossible. Finally, an eflective contratt
requires that the partner not be able to subsequently contract with the opponent". Green then goes on
to model the polar opposite of these assumptions in an axiomatic bargaining framework.7
2, ~vhich also concludes with suggestions for further research.
2 The Model and Results
2.1 ~amework
As in Bulow and Rogoff [1985,1989~, we assume that the sovereign debtor maximizes a
utility function of the simple, discounted, linear form:
U - ~ (Co f CF)
(1 f d)~
(1)
where {C~, Ci} are its quantities of consumption of the domestic and foreign goods,
respectively, and d is its intertemporal discount factor. The sovereign debtor produces a
volume Y of the tradeable domestic good, which it can sell for a price (P 1 1) units oï the
foreign good. Given the simple linear preferences embodied in equation (1), the sovereign
debtor thus always strictly prefers to be at a corner solution of jull trade; presumably,
this unrealistic assumption facilitated the use oí the Rubinstein [1982] bargaining model
in Bulow-Rogoff's analysis. For simplicity, we assume that the new level of P follo~ving
the sovereign debt "crisis" - in which the previously contracted level of debt repayment
is not forthcoming írom the sovereign debtor - is certain to remain constant in future.
We shall briefly raise the implications of rclaxing this assumption below.
Past and potential lenders to the sovereign debtor include a set of competing banks
(or s}'ndicates thereof), all based in a single creditor country, for simplicit}'. These banks
have profit functions that are (a) linear in units of repayment in the foreign (to the
debtor) good, and (b) discounted intertemporally at a rate of interest - C d. It is tkie
lower discount rate of banks, relative to that of the sovereign debtor, that creates tlie
desirability of strictly positive borrowing by the debtor country. It is assumed that the
proceeds from any new borrowing, in the past or at present, is immediately consumed by
the debtor, which is consistent with the preferences specified in equation (1). However,
the amount repaid per period, R, is determined in a bargaining process among the debtor8
country and its creditor(s), with the costs oídisagreement arising from the threatened use
of trade sanctions which disrupt the desired exports by the sovereign debtor. As a result,
the maximum level of repayment R that is incentive-compatible for the debtor country
is a function of its terms of trade, P. It is assumed, to provide a historical context, that
the past terms of trade, Po ~ P, supported in the above sense a contracted repayment
amount C per period that is no longer incentive-compatible for the debtor country. 'o
However, the threatened use of trade sanctions in the event of lack of agreement bet~veen
the debtor and its creditor(s), must also be made incentive-compatible, or credible, for
the creditor-country government which, as we have argued in the Introduction, must be
given an active and strategic role in the trade sanction process, in order to differentiate
the Bulow-Rogoff [1988,1989] "storyn from that of Eaton and Gersovitz [1981].
The government in the creditor country maximizes a welfare function that takes ac-
count of óoth consumers' surplus from unimpeded trade with the sovereign debtor country
for its citizens, as well as the profits (losses) of the bank creditors located in the creditor
country. The consumer surplus from unimpeded trade with the sovereign debtor country
is assumed to have the simple form:
Creditor-Country Consumer Surplus - Z(P)Y (2)
~vhere Z(P) is decreasing in P, the terms of trade of the debtor country. This expression
is a reduced form for the incremental consumer surplus obtained írom the products of
thís particular debtor country, for which imper{ect substitutes presumably exist in the
form of importable goods from other countries. In addition to this consumer surplus,
the creditor country government also gives weight to its banks' profits írom lending,
in deciding on whether or not to impose trade sanctions following upon a breakdo~vn
in negotiations between the banks and the sovereign debtor country. For simplicity, ~ve
'oThe shiCt in the tetms of trade, from Po to P, may be talcen to be "unanticipated", ot, if the timing
of it were anticipated, then incotporated in the amount of funds originally lent by the banks to the
sovereign debtor, i.e., the discounted sum of repayments C when Po held, Collowed by some R C C
afterwards.9
shall assume that the creditor-country government cares only about the taxes paid by its
banks, which are reduced by T t II(D) in the event of default by an amount D, relative
to the old sovereign debt "contractn of repaying C per period, when T is the tax rate
and II(D) is the banks' loss from default. We shall assume that:
II(D) - D without trade sanctions
- D~ a(D) with trade sanctions (3)
where, in line with Bulow-Rogoff (1989~, a(D) is a positive-valued increasing function
that represents any recoveries that the banks can make through seizures of the debtor
country's assets in creditor-country locations etc. More general utilitarian formulations,
as in R.ay (1990~, could also be used to specify governmental preferences.
The trade sanctions themselves, imposed by the creditor-country government, are
assumed to take the form of a tariff incnease that lowers the price received by the debtor
country for its exportables by a ítaction p, the fractional ad valorem tariff rate. It is
assumed that imperfect competition, among the exportables of the debtor country and
others exporting to the creditor country, causes the price of the debtor's exportables
to rise to P(Q), strictly increasing in Q, which leads to the quantity demanded by tlie
creditor-country consumers to fall to ry(Q).i', where ry(p) E [0, 1~ is strictly decreasing in
Q, in the goods market equilibrium.
Besides the sovereign debtor, the creditor banks, the creditor-country government
(i~~ith its non-strategic citizens), there is a jourth player in our model, the multilateral
financia] institution, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. ~Ve
assume that this institution can act, credibly and irrevocably, as an agent to the creditor-
country government in the following limited sense. The creditor-country government can
put up a bond of value B in units of its produced good, with the understanding that
the multilateral institution a-ill provide aB to the sovereign debtor country as "debt
relief", in every period that the creditor-country government does not declare trade
sanctions against the sovereign debtor country. If, in any period, trade sanctions arelo
declared against the debtor country, then no debt relief is provided, and rB accrues
back to the (equity) account of the creditor country at the multilateral institution. It is
assumed, in line with Schelling ~1960] but in contrast to elements of Green (1990~, that
no communication between the multilateral institution agent and the sovereign debtor
country - which might be used to generate side-payments that eliminate the institution's
incentive to enforce the delegated contingent contract above - is feasible. As ~ve shall
see, the amount aB is chosen to create credibility for the use of the trade sanction threat
by the creditor-country government, and in equilibrium it is creditor banks that obtain
this amount, in addition to other repayments made by the sovereign debtor. Thus, the
formal debt contract, of repayment C per period, is never written down to a level that
equals the repayment by the sovereign debtor itselí. rt This feature of our model may be
germane to explaining the empirically observed delays in the debt write-down process.
Given the set-up above, we can now analyze:
(i) the conditions under which trade sanction threats would be credible for the creditor-
country government; and
(ii) the maximum repayment R that would be extracted írom the debtor-countr}~ gov-
ernment, given the sanction threat.
2.2 Analysis
In the event of disagreement between the sovereign debtor and its bank creditors, leading
to (credible) trade sanctions by the creditor-country government, the sovereign debtor
can either (a) export what it can, or (b) consume its domestic production itself. lt ~vill
do the former upto the point where:
(1 - Q).11(~3) ? 1
or if
11~Ve assume throughout that "extortionary" trade sanction threats, made in an attempt to extract
payments more than the "contractual" amount C from the debtor country, are ruled out by some





where M(Q) L P(Q) is the marginal revenue on the export leve] 7(Q). The debtor
country thus derives a payoff of
II(Q) - A1ax[1, {(1 - Q)P(Q)~(Q) -}. (1 - 7(Q))}]Y (5)
versus that of
PS' (6)
in the event oí no trade sanctions.
Unlike in Bulow-Rogoff [1989], we do not bother with the possibility of allow~ing
the debtor to store its exportable production, leading to discounted Rubinstein [1982]
bargaining with the creditor banks. The reason is simple. Even in the most favorable
case for trade-sanction threats, where P(Q) - P,y(Q) - Y because of perfect substitutes
for the debtor's exportables, the maximum repayment that can be extracted from the
debtor with the one-shot trade sanction threat is [P - 1]Y, whereas Rubinstein [1982]
bargaining would lead to a repayment f(d, a)PY, where f(d, a E(0, 1) depends on the
relative discount rates of the banks and the debtor. As d~ r, and the bargaining period
is shortened, f(d, n) -a 0.5 which is likely to be much larger than P~, and f(d, r, )~
0.5 for d~~r. It seems that the applicability of the Rubinstein (1982] bargaining model
is of dubious relevance in the sovereign debt context, as the debtor would not choose to
store.
In any event, the maximum repayment that the debtor would make, given the trade
sanction threat embodied in the fractional ad-valorem tariff Q, is given by comparing
equations (5) and (6), to be:12
R(Q) - PY - TI(Q) (7)
in units of the creditor-country produced good. Notice that if Q is optimally set by the
creditor-country government to be sufficiently high to eliminate trade, because inequalit}~
(4) is violated at zero exports, then R(Q) -(P - 1)Y.
We now consider the incentives oí the creditor-country government to impose trade
sanctions, at some (subgame-perfect) optimally chosen tariff level Q, in the event of dis-
agreement among the sovereign debtor and the creditor banks regarding the amount to
be repaid. Recognizing that, if trade-sanction threats are credible, then on the equilib-
rium path a repayment amount R(Q) will be extracted without trade sanctions, so that
the creditor-country government will enjoy a payoff per period oí:
E(Q, B) - (Z(P)Y - T{C - R(Q) - ~(C - R(Q))} - (1 - T)r, B~ (3)
The three terms in equation (8) represent the consumer surplus from unimpeded trade,
the tax loss from bank loan writeoffs, taking into account the side-payment nB to the
sovereign country debtor and ultimately to creditor banks, via the multilateral institution,
respectively.
On the other hand, ií the debtor country defaults and pays zero, then the creditor-
country government must compare its payoff without trade sanctions:
E~(B) - Z(P)Y - T{C - a(C)} -(1 - T)~rB
with its payoff with trade sanctions:
Es(Q) - 1`4px(Z(P(Q))7(Q)Y - T{C - n(C)} f QP(Q)7(Q)}']
(9)
(10)
In writing equation (10) as we have, we are assuming that the condition in inequality13
(4), for the profitability of some exports by the debtor country, is satisfied; if Q is high
enough to violate inequality (4), then 7(p) should be rep]aced by zero in equation (10).
The creditor-country government's problem can hence be expressed as:







Note that we have assumed if the debtor defaults and "invites" trade sanctions, he will
repay nothing, which is obvioust~. The tariff level ~' represents the subgame-perfect
trade sanction; the openness problem in (12b) can be remedied by specifying a minimum
(adminstratively feasible) level of the punitive tariff rate, Q.
It is fairly obvious that the answer to the maximization problem above will not al~vays
involve B- 0, which would have required no third-party contracting with multilateral
institutions. The crucial issue is that of the reaction of the price oi the debtor's exportable
P(Q) to the ad-valorem tariff ~3, as well as the quantity reaction 7(Q), all arising írom
competition among countries exporting to the creditor-country. Ií the sovereign debtor
is, for example, a monopolist exporter facing a demand curve Q(P), he or she ~vill choose
P(Q) to maximize
A1ax [(1 - Q)P(Q)Q(P(A)) - Q(PÍQ)))
P(p)
(13)
where the second-term in equation (13) represents the opportunity cost of not consuming
the exportable good. The first-order condition to (13) is:
~~It is clear that inequality (12a) and the problem (126) are unafTected in the event of non-zero
repayments 6elow R(Q') by the debtor; hence repaying either 0 or R(Q') is optimal for the debtor.14
f(1- a)Q(P(a)) ~- Q~(P(a)){p(a)(1- a) -1}] - o (14)
w.here primes denote derivatives, and we assume Q'(P) G 0. Generically, both P(a)
and hence Q(P(a)) - 7(a)Y, will react to changes in ~i. If the change is suf,~icienlly
important, that will imply that, given equations (9) and (10), the inequality ( 12a) can
not be satisfied for B - 0, at any a ~ 0, and hence trade sanctions lose their credibility,
leading to zero repayments by the sovereign debtor, which will not be optimal (in equation
(11)) for the creditor-country government, in general.
To illustrate, consider an extreme case in which a E{0,1}, so that disruption of
trade is either absent or total, leading to 7(0) - l,ry(1) - 0. Then we see that to make
E~(a) - Ez(1), in order to make the trade sanction threat credible, we must set
(1 -T)~rB- Z(P)Y (15)
Is that going to be optimal for the creditor-country government? If it set B- 0, then
it ~~~ould elicit no repayment from the sovereign debtor to its banks, and thus its o~.erall
pa}'off i~.ould be:
E,(0) - (Z(P)Y - T{C - c~(C)}] (1G)
On the other hand, if it set nB as in equation (15), then it would elicit a repayment to
its banks of
R(a- 1) - (P- 1)Y (17)
leading to the overall creditor-country government payoff of:
E a- 1, B-
Z(P)Y
( ~r(1 -T)15
- -T{C - (P- 1)Y-a(C- (P- 1)Y)) (1S)
In comparing the payoffs in equations (16) and (18), assuming that a(C) ~ 0, we see that
setting up a side-contract with the multilateral institution is optimal for this creditor-
country government if nnd only if
Z(P)Y c T(P - 1)Y (19)
which is, of course, a condition that can be met quite plausibly.
An interpretation of equation (19) bears emphasis. When P is high, and Z(P) is
close to zero, such a conditional side-payment scheme administered through a third-
party multilateral institution agent is both beneficial and achieved at little cost (r, B) to
the creditor-country government. If P is close to 1, and Z(P) is high, such third-party
contracting is unlikely to help the creditor-country government; it would be optimal
to let the (impoverished) debtor country default on its loans to creditor banks (for
example, sub-Saharan Africa?). It is in the middle regime, which in the real ~sorld
involves complications relating to 8uctuations in P randomly over time, that difficult
and flexible choices of optimal governmental policies are involved.
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